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A B S T R A C T   
Despite a series of claims from Bernie Sanders (2015), Barack Obama (2015), and others arguing that climate 
change, radicalisation, and terrorism are connected by complex causal relationships, there is very little academic 
examination of the politics of these claims. Building on DeLanda’s (2006) account of assemblages and social 
complexity, this paper conceptualises climate change-terrorism-radicalisation relationships as a ‘climate 
terrorism assemblage’. A ‘climate terrorism assemblage’ is a complex, emergent ‘whole’ formed from a hetero-
geneous range of interacting geopolitical components (e.g. climatic factors, migration, think tanks and academic 
publications, and a discourse of ‘climate security’). Specifically, a climate terrorism assemblage is characterised 
by ‘strategic territorialisations’: context-specific, multi-scalar points at which political claims of causal links 
between climate change, terrorism, and radicalisation are crystallised. Strategic territorialisations are produced 
in two, interrelated contexts. First, using the case study of the Syrian Conflict, a climate terrorism assemblage 
reveals an intricate, contested politics of ‘drawing lines’ which link climate change, terrorism, and radicalisation. 
Secondly, the paper argues that, at the points at which causal links are constructed between climate change, 
terrorism and radicalisation, a climate terrorism assemblage territorialises around intersectional subject for-
mations, in particular a young masculine subject vulnerable to potential radicalisation and terrorism. Overall, the 
paper concludes that a climate terrorism assemblage provides a productive analytic frame to investigate the 
contested power relations of climate change-radicalisation-terrorism connections.   
1. Introduction 
In a 2015 US presidential debate for the Democratic nomination 
(14th November), contested between Bernie Sanders and Hilary Clinton, 
Sanders claimed controversially that climate change is ‘directly related 
to the growth of terrorism’ (Richardson, 2015). Sanders argued that 
particular effects of climate changes (e.g. droughts and heatwaves) 
could exacerbate food and water insecurities, worsen livelihood secu-
rity, and create political conditions (e.g. unemployment and conflict) 
that facilitate the recruitment and operations of terrorist groups. These 
comments are no doubt related to the hype that surrounded the 2015 
Paris Conference of Parties ((COP), 30th November-12th December) and 
subsequent Paris Agreement; as Sch€afer, Scheffran, and Penniket (2015) 
point to, climate security discourses tend to peak at significant geopo-
litical moments. This paper grapples with the politics of these causal 
claims. Theorising climate change-terrorism-radicalisation linkages as a 
‘climate terrorism assemblage’, the paper makes two claims. Firstly, I 
argue that climate change-terrorism-radicalisation connections reveal a 
nuanced politics of attribution about where causal ‘lines are drawn’: 
which climate factors are linked to radicalisation or terrorism? Are links 
drawn at all? How do these links mediate complex causality in a climate 
terrorism assemblage? These causal attributions, one form of what this 
paper terms ‘strategic territorialisations’ in a climate terrorism assem-
blage, reveal a climate security politics contested by a range of terri-
torialising political components (think tanks, concepts such as ‘youth 
bulge theory’, political figures (for example Barack Obama), affects of 
frustration and subjectifications of young masculinities). In exploring 
the politics of causal connections between climate change, terrorism and 
radicalisation, I examine the processes of (re)composition of these po-
litical components (following DeLanda (2006)). How do different, het-
erogeneous combinations of components assemble to (de)territorialise a 
climate terrorism assemblage in ways that reflect particular power re-
lations (about climate change in the context of the War on Terror in the 
US, for example, or a need to promote climate mitigation and adaptation 
in the context of the 2015 Conference of Parties)? My second claim is 
that a second form of ‘strategic territorialisation’ in a climate terrorism 
assemblage refers to intersectional subjectivities. In this case, fleeting 
figurations of young, frustrated, ‘African’ masculinities permeate 
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assumptions about causal links between climate-induced vulnerabilities, 
radicalisation, and terrorism. Overall, I contend that a climate terrorism 
assemblage provides an effective means – through tracing its strategic 
(de)territorialisations – to investigate the politics of climate 
change-terrorism-radicalisation connections. 
These arguments are unpacked in several sections. Firstly, the paper 
introduces academic and policy debates around climate security, radi-
calisation and terrorism. Secondly, the paper introduces the concept of a 
‘climate terrorism assemblage’, building on Delanda’s (2006) realist 
account of assemblages and social complexity. Investigating the dy-
namics of a ‘climate terrorism assemblage’, the paper first explores a 
politics of causal attribution for climate change-radicalisation-terrorism 
connections, drawing on insights from Connolly (2004), Spivak (2012 
(1987)), Krenshaw (1991) and Latour (1988) to highlight the tensions 
between the emergent, complex causalities of a climate terrorism 
assemblage and the politics of constructing causal ‘breaks’ – ‘drawing 
lines’ – in the processes of the assemblage’s (re)composition. Secondly, 
the paper examines the intersectional subjectivities that permeate these 
causal interconnections, drawing upon Puar’s (2007) reworking of 
intersectionality to highlight how masculinities are constructed through 
the contingent territorialisation of multiple components (linguistic 
signification, affects of anger and frustration, and theories of a ‘youth 
bulge’) in a climate terrorism assemblage. Finally, the paper concludes 
with reflections on ‘climate terrorism assemblages’ and what this 
concept offers to critical climate security scholarship. 
2. Climate security and terrorism 
Climate insecurity can be defined as the conditions ‘under which the 
effects of climate variability and/or change are represented as threat-
ening to a group of affected actors’ (Mason, 2014, p. 807). Climate se-
curity is concerned with the security implications (for example flooding 
of military installations) that could arise from the effects of climate 
variability (e.g. changes to the intensities and frequencies of extreme 
weather events) (Barnett, 2003). The security implications of climate 
change have been highlighted in a range American and other interna-
tional government and think tank reports (Schwartz & Randall, 2003; 
Campbell et al. 2007; Department of Defense 2010 and 2014). Critical 
security scholars have also examined themes such as security and 
climate-induced migration (Boas, 2015; Telford, 2018; White, 2011), 
discourses of climate security (Detraz & Betsill, 2009; McDonald, 2013; 
Oels, 2013), and the uptake of ‘resilience’ by climate security actors 
(Boas & Rothe, 2016; Rothe, 2016). As De Goede and Randalls (2009) 
note in their critique of pre-emption strategies, associations have also 
been drawn between climate change and terrorism. Writing for Science 
magazine, the then UK Chief Scientific Adviser Sir David King (2004, p. 
174) writes, in the context of the Bush administration’s failure to pro-
duce climate action: ‘climate change is the most severe problem we face 
today – more serious even than the threat of terrorism.’ Furthermore, 
Hopkins (2008, original emphasis) writes in the Bulletin of Atomic Sci-
entists that ‘climate change and the war on terror mix like oil and water’, 
and that ‘climate change and violent extremism must be delinked in the 
eyes of the public’. Importantly, however, whilst these authors highlight 
discursive comparisons between climate change, radicalisation, and 
terrorism, they do not focus on the causal connections between these 
issues. 
Sedgwick (2010) argues that radicalisation can be conceptualised in 
absolute or relative terms. A relative understanding constructs a con-
tinuum between those ideas or individuals deemed ‘radical’ and ‘mod-
erate’ and denotes movement along this continuum, raising important 
questions about political decisions that constitute the continuum and 
about how ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ are defined (Sedgwick, 2010). An 
‘absolute’ conceptualisation assumes a self-evident, fixed division be-
tween ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’: radicalisation becomes a zero-sum-game 
governed by ‘Us-versus-Them’ imaginative geographies. Richards 
(2015) critiques conceptions of ‘radicalisation’ for their overemphasis 
on individual agency (how an individual is ‘radicalised’, ‘lone wolf’ 
attackers, a person’s ‘de-radicalisation’, etc.) at the expense of under-
lying socioeconomic and political factors behind ‘radicalised’ violence. 
Terrorism is a similarly mercurial concept. Chalecki (2001, p. 3) begins 
by introducing the US Government’s definition (from Title 22, Section 
2656 of the U.S. Code): ‘premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.’ She 
(2001) identifies four characteristics for acts of terrorism: motivation 
(ideologies and motives), means (technologies and methods used to 
execute political violence), targets (the targets of the attack), and enemy 
(the perceived enemy violence is directed against). However, Coleman 
(2003) argues that by naming an action as ‘terrorism’ or identifying 
‘terrorists’, this demarcates an imaginative geography around a targeted 
‘Us’ in need of protection. In this context, the figure of the terrorist can 
be constructed as deviant and ideologically extreme (Puar & Rai, 2002). 
More specifically, terrorism has been linked to environmental factors 
through the concepts of ‘eco-’ and ‘environmental terrorism’. For Cha-
lecki (2001, p. 3), environmental terrorism constitutes ‘the unlawful use 
of force against in situ environmental resources as to deprive populations 
of their benefit(s) and/or destroy other property.’ Potentially dangerous 
attributes of environmental terrorism include dislocation (environ-
mental resources cross borders, making security mobilisations difficult), 
and negative economic implications (terrorist attacks can disrupt eco-
nomic activities, e.g. transportation networks). Chalecki (2001) differ-
entiates between ‘resource-as-target’ terrorism (ecosystems are the focus 
of the attack) and ‘resource-as-tool’ terrorism (environmental resources 
are coopted as tools of violence). Thus, the environment becomes a tool 
or target of political violence, with an aspiration to evoke fear in pop-
ulations. O’Lear (2003) critiques this perspective from two viewpoints. 
First is to ask what ‘the environment’ means in an environmental 
terroristic scenario (for example, does it include energy systems such as 
dams)? Second, are non-state actors the only perpetrators of environ-
mental terrorism; does state violence play into these debates? More 
specifically, ‘eco-terrorism’ describes the destruction of property by 
radical environmental groups motivated by a biocentric ideology (call-
ing for all living things to have an equal moral status) (Chalecki, 2001). 
The Earth Liberation Front, a radical environmental group founded in 
the UK and active in North America, burned down a ski lodge in Vail, 
Colorado in October 1998, resulting in $12 million of damage (Allhoff & 
Buciak, 2013). However, in an analysis of illegal activities with an 
environmental motive in the US (1970–2007), Carson, LaFree, and 
Dugan (2012) identify 39 incidents in 1989, through to a peak of 159 in 
2001, followed by a decrease of 79% through to 2007, showing a decline 
in crimes (let alone terrorist crimes) with an environmental dimension 
from the early to mid-2000s. 
In the context of possible climate change-terrorism-radicalisation 
connections, Renard (2008) identifies three types of possible causal 
relation: ‘instigating causes’, ‘permissive factors’, and ‘precipitant 
events’. Instigating causes are deep-rooted causes of terrorism: basic 
factors necessary for terrorism to develop but that do not automatically 
produce acts of violence. They include the poverty and income reduc-
tion, inequalities between social groups, and the regime type and sta-
bility (corrupt governance and authoritarian regimes are argued to be 
more likely to invoke resentment from subjugated populations) (Renard, 
2008). ‘Permissive factors’ facilitate the use of violence: they are not 
sufficient or necessary for terrorism, but can contribute to its develop-
ment (Renard, 2008). Regime instability or ‘failed states’ could provide 
space for groups to mobilise outside of legal authority, and regime 
openness (linked to globalised travel connections and information 
technologies) could facilitate dissemination of terrorist materials 
(Renard, 2008). Precipitant events are the final triggers that start a 
process of violence, e.g. loss of a family member or experience of a 
disaster (Renard, 2008). Climate change could exacerbate these factors 
in multiple ways. It could increase poverty (affecting food security and 
livelihoods) and inequalities (with scarce resources captured by elites, 
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or grievances invoked by climate injustices), which could act as insti-
gating causes for terrorist activity (Renard, 2008). Renard (2008, p. 44) 
agrees with the CNA’s (2007) conclusion that climate change is a ‘threat 
multiplier’: it will not create new permissive factors, but exacerbate 
existing factors related to terrorism. Mass, Comardicea, and Bod�o (2013) 
argue that it is unlikely large-scale environmental terrorism will occur in 
the immediate future, but locate two possible pathways through which it 
might develop. First is ‘evolution’, in which environmental resources 
would contribute to the tools or targets of existing terrorists. Second is 
the ‘emergence’ of new organisations with different ideologies, strate-
gies, etc. (Mass et al. 2013, p. 212). They argue that it is very difficult to 
predict how terrorist organisations might develop, let alone to prepare 
contingencies for every possible form of attack (Mass et al. 2013). 
Building on a larger academic literature which explores the links 
between environmental change and conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Mach 
et al., 2019; Nordås & Gleditsch, 2007; Selby, 2014), there have been 
several studies which explore the links between climatic factors and 
individual or communal participation in political violence (for example 
joining non-state armed groups (NSAGs)) (Fjelde & von Uexkull, 2012; 
Vestby, 2014). Salehyan and Hendrix (2014) recognise two theories 
which postulate links between climate change and participation in po-
litical violence. The first is a neo-Malthusian argument that resource 
scarcities over land, food or water could generate grievances and 
resource competition as groups fight over the available resources. Sec-
ond is the opportunity costs model, which suggests that the likelihood of 
participation in a conflict increases as incomes fall. Thus, if climate 
change impacts upon economic prosperity (for example through re-
ductions to agricultural yields, flood damages, or availability of pasture 
for livestock), this could increase the likelihood of individuals partici-
pating in political violence (Salehyan & Hendrix, 2014). Using Afro-
barometer surveys and the Sun Exposure Protection Index as a measure 
of climatic change, Vestby (2014) argues that, in a situation where a 
person’s individual living conditions decrease due to drought, this could 
increase their chance of participation in political violence. However, in a 
study of the impacts of two typhoons in the Philippines (Bopha in 2012 
and Haiyan in 2013), Walch (2018) argues that environmental shocks 
decrease the likelihood of recruitment to armed rebel groups, in this case 
the New People’s Army. Walch (2018) contends that disasters induce 
scarcity for rebel combatants, weakening their logistics and supply lines, 
and therefore affecting their ability to recruit. Additionally, the provi-
sion of extensive government assistance and collaboration with inter-
national humanitarian actors can both reduce the territorial control of 
rebel combatants but also make recruitment a riskier process (Walch, 
2018). Based on this evidence, Walch (2018) concludes that rebel 
recruitment was significantly weakened in the aftermath of the 
typhoons. 
In a study of NSAGs, Adelphi (2017, p. III-IV) argue that there is no 
direct link between climate change and NSAG-derived violence. Instead, 
climate change impacts can exacerbate fragile, conflict-affected envi-
ronments and create space for NSAGs to operate (Butts & Bankus, 2013). 
In particular, Adelphi (2017, p. III-IV) identify three dynamics through 
climate impacts can exacerbate situations conducive to the growth of 
NSAGs. First is that climate change contributes to fragility, e.g. with 
conflicts linked natural resources and livelihood insecurity. NSAGs can 
proliferate and function more effectively in these environments, espe-
cially where there is a lack of state authority or legitimacy (‘ungoverned 
spaces’). Second is that climate change negatively affects livelihoods 
(particularly through food and water insecurities) in many regions, 
providing opportunities for NSAGs to offer alternative economic in-
centives for recruitment or respond to socioeconomic grievances. 
Finally, NSAGs can use climate-affected environments and natural re-
sources as a weapon, e.g. control of dams (Adelphi, 2017). These ac-
counts build causal chains in which climate change variability 
exacerbates existing factors – poverty, social tensions, and political 
instability – and contributes indirectly to NSAG growth. 
Fundamentally, any proposed causal connections between climate 
change, terrorism and radicalisation are almost certainly complex, 
grounded in multiple systemic feedbacks, and nonlinear (Adelphi, 
2017). In a study of responses to the 2010 floods in the Sindh region of 
Pakistan, Siddiqi (2014) documents her ethnographic work with Islamist 
group Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) as first responders for humanitarian wel-
fare, e.g. with food packages and healthcare. However, she finds no 
relationship between the withdrawal of government support and an 
upsurge in JuD support. There were blurred divisions in which JuD 
representatives interchanged with local politicians, community leaders, 
army employees and aid workers (Siddiqi, 2014). As Siddiqi (2014, p. 
887) writes: ‘I argue that while Islamist groups did influence and affect 
the post-disaster political landscape in southern Sindh, the relationship 
between climatic disasters and such radical politics is not linear and 
requires a far more complex analysis.’ As such, investigation of climate 
change-terrorism-radicalisation linkages requires a context-sensitive 
analysis of complex causal connections. This paper conceptualises 
climate change-terrorism-radicalisation linkages as a ‘climate terrorist 
assemblage’. With a focus on the politics of causal attribution and on 
intersectional subjectivities, I examine points at which a ‘climate 
terrorist assemblage’ (de)territorialises and what these momentary ter-
ritorialisations suggest for climate security politics. 
3. A ‘climate terrorism assemblage’? 
As Dittmer (2014) notes, assemblage theory is a productive analytic 
for engagement with complex geopolitical challenges, including climate 
change. DeLanda (2006, p. 8) begins from a realist social ontology, the 
aim of which is to examine processes of assembly for different entities. In 
this context, assemblages are defined as ‘wholes whose properties 
emerge from interactions between parts’ (DeLanda, 2006, p. 10); each 
assemblage is unique and singular, a consequence of specific historical 
and geographical processes. Assemblages are characterised by complex 
interactions between the properties of their component parts (the actu-
alized features that define the assemblage), and their capacities (the 
possibilities for an assemblage to affect, to interact with other assem-
blages in complex ways) (DeLanda, 2006). Capacities enable interaction 
in innumerable, difficult-to-predict ways, both between component 
parts within an assemblage and between assemblages. In this sense, 
assemblages are defined by their emergence: ‘a property of the whole 
that is not shared by, or reducible to its component parts’ (Braun, 2008, 
p. 679). As DeLanda (2006) argues, assemblages interact in nonlinear, 
complex ways which generate emergent phenomena that are different to 
that which came before. 
For DeLanda (2006), assemblages can be mapped along three axes. 
The first axis concerns the roles that components in an assemblage can 
assume. These can be material (e.g. a border wall) at one end of the axis, 
or expressive at the other (e.g. legislation to enforce border controls). 
Components often involve a mix of material and expressive roles 
(DeLanda, 2006; Dittmer, 2014). The second axis concerns the extent to 
which the assemblage is territorialising or deterritorialising (the extent 
to which its boundaries and identity are being stabilised and fixed, or 
destabilised and deconstructed). The final axis concerns how the 
assemblage is coded: how the identity of an assemblage is codified 
through linguistic and non-linguistic phenomena. DeLanda (2006, p. 14) 
argues that the components of assemblages are characterised by ‘re-
lations of exteriority’ that are ‘contingently obligatory’; they can be 
detached from one assemblage and plugged into another with different 
sets of interactions whilst retaining a degree of autonomy. As such, the 
properties of the whole (the assemblage) can never be simply explained 
by aggregating the properties of its component parts: it is the capacities 
of these components that determine how the assemblage changes 
(Anderson, Kearnes, McFarlane, & Swanton, 2012). 
To what extent, however, can one describe a ‘climate terrorism 
assemblage’? Here, my contention is that climate change-terrorism- 
radicalisation connections can be fruitfully analysed as a ‘climate 
terrorism assemblage’ in and of themselves, a context-specific example 
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of a geopolitical assemblage. A ‘climate terrorism assemblage’ is 
composed of heterogeneous components – material realities (shifting 
climate patterns, availability and access to food, documents produced by 
think tanks), discursive constructions (the concept of ‘climate security’), 
affective resonances, territorialisations of complex causality, and inter-
sectional subject formations. These elements can interchange and 
interact with component parts of other assemblages, but a ‘climate 
terrorism assemblage’ is implicated in context-specific historical and 
geographical trajectories, a complex, open ‘whole’ with distinctive 
codifications. This paper will explore how different material and 
nonmaterial components of a climate terrorism assemblage are impli-
cated in the causal politics of its (re)constitution. These include speech 
acts (for example from Barack Obama), geopolitical reports (from the 
United States’ National Intelligence Council), affective resonances (the 
‘anger’ and ‘frustration’ of young males whose vulnerability is affected 
by climate insecurities), and conceptual tools which affect a climate 
terrorism assemblage’s orientation (e.g. ‘youth bulge theory’ and the 
concept of a ‘threat multiplier’). These components are primarily 
derived from an American climate security context (e.g. American think 
tanks such as the Center for Naval Analyses and political figures such as 
Barack Obama); as Diez, von Lucke, and Wellman (2016) note, the 
United States, particularly the American defense and security sectors, 
are by far the most prominent producers of climate security discourse 
and components of a climate terrorism assemblage. Whilst other climate 
security contexts are important for the perpetuation of climate security 
discourses, this paper focuses on components of a climate terrorism 
assemblage that originate from US political contexts. Building on 
Delanda’s (2006) approach, I contend that a ‘climate terrorist assem-
blage’ provides a potent analytic framework to examine the unequal 
politics of climate change-terrorism-radicalisation connections. In 
particular, I focus on two sites of territorialisation for a climate terrorism 
assemblage: a politics of causal complexity and attribution, and inter-
sectional subject formations in climate change-terrorism-radicalisation 
connections. These sites are examined using two examples from 
climate security politics: the Syrian Civil War and development of ISIS, 
and discussions of young masculinities implicated in conditions of 
climate insecurity. 
4. Causal complexity: a politics of attribution? 
DeLanda (2006) argues that assemblage thinking challenges a linear, 
efficient model of causality (what he (2006: 20) terms ‘same cause, same 
effect, always’, the notion that a particular cause will produce a 
particular effect in every context) in several respects. Firstly, particular 
‘triggers’ or ‘catalytic’ factors can cause a range of different effects 
within the same assemblage; there is no necessary reason why the same 
cause must always produce the same effect. Secondly, there is no strict 
reason why a particular cause will always produce the same effect. To 
illustrate this, DeLanda (2006, p. 21) uses the causal statement ‘smoking 
causes cancer’. For populations of assemblages (in this case of human 
actors), smoking may lead to cancer in a percentage of cases, but 
because of the different environmental conditions and genetic charac-
teristics of individuals within the population, cancer will not develop in 
every case. The development of cancer can be understood probabilisti-
cally, in terms of statistical causality. For these two reasons, DeLanda 
(2006) argues that simple linear causality (‘same cause, same effect, 
always’) is limited in an assemblage context. Instead, there are ‘recip-
rocal forms of determination between parts that can be accommodated 
via nonlinear mechanisms involving feedback’ (DeLanda, 2006, p. 21). 
Because of these complex, nonlinear causal interactions, the properties 
of the assemblage as a whole are more than an aggregation of its 
component parts. 
Connolly (2005) extends Delanda’s (2006) logic to explore political 
complexity. He (2005) argues that linear, efficient causality – the notion 
that factors can be separated out and explored in isolation to determine 
which factors cause the others – is insufficient to explain political 
complexity. Indeed, as Connolly (2005, pp. 869–70, original emphasis) 
writes: ‘in politics … causality morphs into energized complexities of 
mutual imbrication and interinvolvement, in which heretofore uncon-
nected or loosely associated elements fold, bend, blend, emulsify, and 
dissolve into each other, forging a qualitative assemblage resistant to 
classical models of explanations.’ Causal interactions are complex res-
onances: they involve emergent interactions between different elements 
in heterogeneous, multiple ways. Causal interactions are emergent in 
three senses: firstly, in that the characteristics of causal interactions are 
not knowable in precise detail prior to the effects that emerge from these 
interactions; secondly, the effects become infused into causal in-
teractions to the extent that it can be difficult to disentangle the causes 
from effects; and thirdly that a series of feedback loops operate between 
each level of causal interaction (Connolly, 2005). A logical implication 
of this approach is that emergent causation is not susceptible to com-
plete explanation. Given that the effects of emergent causation cannot be 
precisely predicted or fully conceptualised in advance, this makes it 
impossible to have full explanations of the assemblages involved (Con-
nolly, 2004). As DeLanda (2006) notes, empirical analysis of assem-
blages is causal, not conceptual: there is a focus on examining a range of 
actual and possible causal interactions, not on provision of an exhaustive 
theoretical model. Connolly (2004, pp. 344–5) argues that political 
analysis in this context should seek to make strategic interventions in 
these assemblages: to use combinations of evaluation, participation and 
explanation to ‘move the complex in this way or that’. This paper in-
vestigates the politics of complex causal interventions in a climate 
terrorism assemblage. How, in an attempt to delineate the complex 
causalities of a climate terrorism assemblage, are particular power re-
lations and subjectivities territorialised? How are causal lines drawn 
which create a semblance of ‘pattern’ and ‘explanation’ and how do 
these influence the assemblage’s trajectory? 
In asking these questions, there are several important qualifications. 
Firstly, I do not assume that, in the process of causal lines being ‘drawn’ 
in a climate terrorism assemblage, it is a single, sovereign actor doing 
the ‘drawing’. As Anderson et al. (2012) note, an implication of 
assemblage thinking is that causality is no longer centred in a sovereign, 
pre-given agent, but in the differential assembly of heterogeneous parts. 
Causal interactions in a climate terrorism assemblage do not rest with a 
sovereign agent that can make decisions in the abstract, but are the 
consequence of a distributed assemblage which constitutes agency as an 
effect of multiple, heterogeneous interactions. In this sense, the climate 
terrorism assemblage (inclusive of political claims about causal re-
lationships between climate change, terrorism and radicalisation) is 
composed of multiple, heterogeneous components that interact in 
particular ways. The focus in this paper is on speech acts, geopolitical 
reports and conceptual tools (which, through discursive signification, 
are components which play expressive roles in coding a climate 
terrorism assemblage). However, a climate terrorism assemblage is also 
assembled from components which play material roles, e.g. physical 
changes in climate, experiences of rural-urban migration, depletions in 
agricultural outputs, computers which transmit messages, speeches and 
reports on climate insecurities, the physical realities of a think tank of-
fice and its environs, and the biochemical and electrical constitutions of 
human actors implicated in climate security debates (e.g. Barack Obama 
or Bernie Sanders). 
Secondly, in assuming that particular political interests are territor-
ialised at points where causal lines are drawn between climate change, 
terrorism and radicalisation, I do not assume that this ‘drawing’ process 
takes place ‘outside’ of a climate terrorism assemblage. This idea is 
analogous with Harraway’s (1988) critique of the ‘god trick’ in scientific 
research: the idea that a scientist can stand outside of the system which 
they are observing and make objective, detached observations. Instead, 
the power relations and subjectivities implicated in a climate terrorism 
assemblage are themselves components of this assemblage and other 
related assemblages. In ‘drawing’ causal lines, they are themselves 
influencing the causal interactions and trajectory of a climate terrorism 
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assemblage. Whilst there is a need to analyse these relationships, this 
analysis is always inseparable from the assembly and trajectories of the 
climate terrorism assemblage more broadly. This paper focuses on the 
politics of these assembling processes: to understand the role that causal 
claims play in the (re)composition of a climate terrorism assemblage. 
There are fundamental political questions about ‘where the lines are 
drawn’, which factors are connected to climate change at particular 
points in the causal chain, and which combinations of assemblage 
components create and reproduce climate change-terrorism- 
radicalisation causal chains. These spatio-temporal territorialisations, 
processes of ‘drawing lines’ or ‘connecting the dots’ on the complex 
causal pathways that link climate change, terrorism, and radicalisation, 
represent particular crystallisations of unequal power relations in a 
climate terrorist assemblage. They are attempts to code a climate 
terrorism assemblage, to delimit it: the notion that climate change im-
pacts do increase fragility, a denial that climate change plays a role, or 
casting doubts about the extent to which climate plays a role. These at-
tributions are what I term strategic territorialisations, attempts to isolate, 
demarcate or codify (‘drawing lines’) complex causal interactions in a 
climate terrorist assemblage. Using the example of the Syrian Civil War 
and growth of ISIS, I argue that these territorialisations of a climate 
terrorist assemblage – by a range of political interests – reveal a cautious, 
nuanced politics of attribution. 
From what started as a series of protests in March (2011) in the rural 
town of Dara’a, the Syrian Civil War has escalated into a major hu-
manitarian crisis (De Cha^tel, 2014). Two high-profile studies (Gleick, 
2014; Kelley, Mohtadi, Cane, Seagar, & Kushnir, 2015) have analysed 
this topic in relation to climate change, with the latter asserting that 
there is evidence the conflict in Syria is linked to a climate 
change-affected drought. They argue that a drought in the late 2000s 
was the worst on instrumental record in Syria and neighbouring coun-
tries, leading to rural-urban migration of farmers to Syrian cities, 
dissatisfaction with the Assad Government’s agricultural policies, and 
contributing to broader grievances behind the 2011 uprisings and Civil 
War. Kelley et al. (2015) contend that anthropogenic climate change 
made the 2007-10 drought three times more likely than by natural 
forcing alone, and conclude that climate change impacts, indirectly, are 
implicated in the Syrian conflict. From this thesis, Adelphi (2017) claim 
that the instability caused by the drought and outbreak of sectarian 
conflict enabled groups such as ISIS and Al-Nusra to gain control over 
large swathes of Syrian territory (in 2014). For those whose livelihoods 
were affected by food and water insecurities, ISIS offered economic 
opportunities; they also financed infrastructure and provided social 
provision, e.g. basic healthcare services, in order to build public legiti-
macy. Through its control of water infrastructure in occupied regions, 
ISIS could also increase hardship in water-scarce regions (e.g. by con-
trolling flows and electricity supplies from dams) (Adelphi, 2017). For 
both the generally unstable environment characterised by the conflict, 
and facilitation of recruitment, Adelphi (2017) contend that climate 
change is related to the development of ISIS. 
However, these studies are contested (De Cha^tel, 2014; Fr€ohlich, 
2016; Selby, Dahi, Fr€ohlich, & Hulme, 2017). Selby et al. (2017) break 
down the ‘Syria-climate conflict’ thesis into three stages: first, that the 
late 2000s drought is linked to anthropogenic climate change; second, 
that this drought led to large-scale internal migration; and third, that 
these internal migrants contributed to the unrest (2011) which led to the 
outbreak of the conflict. The authors note that it is extremely difficult to 
attribute the 2006-9 drought directly to global anthropogenic climate 
change (Selby et al. 2017). Kelley et al. (2015) and Gleick (2014) also 
take relatively little account of political-economic factors that influ-
enced migration. This includes a decisive turn towards trade liberali-
sation and the removal of agricultural subsidies (for instance for fuel in 
May 2008, which led to an overnight 342% rise in fuel prices), as well as 
long-term mismanagement of irrigation and water management policies 
(De Cha^tel, 2014; Selby et al. 2017). In an interview study with 30 
families from drought-affected rural Syrian governates, Fr€ohlich (2016) 
finds that it is unlikely that migrants to towns such as Dara’a contributed 
to the March 2011 protests, and instead migrated for work reasons. 
Overall, Selby et al. (2017) conclude that for each step of the 
Syria-climate conflict causal chain, there is at present no substantive 
evidence to suggest that climate change was a causal factor in the Syrian 
conflict. Importantly, these debates also reveal a nuanced politics of 
causal attribution. Such a politics is focused on where the causal links 
are drawn in attempts to situate connections between climate change, 
climate-induced migration, terrorism, and radicalisation and which 
strategic political interests these causal connections reflect. For 
example, in a speech to graduates of the US coastguard academy (New 
London, Connecticut (20th May 2015)), Barack Obama states: 
Rising seas are already swallowing low-lying islands, from 
Bangladesh to Pacific islands … Globally, we could see a rise in 
climate refugees. And I guarantee you the coastguard will have to 
respond. Elsewhere, more intense droughts will exacerbate shortages 
of water and food, increase competition for resources, and create the 
potential for mass migrations and new tensions. All of which is why 
the Pentagon calls climate change a “threat multiplier.” 
Understand, climate change did not cause the conflicts we see around 
the world. Yet what we also know is that severe drought helped to 
create the instability in Nigeria that was exploited by the terrorist 
group Boko Haram. It’s now believed that drought and crop failures 
and high food prices helped fuel the early unrest in Syria, which 
descended into civil war in the heart of the Middle East. 
In this speech act, Obama draws indirect connections between 
climate changes, the Syrian drought, and the outbreak of conflict. He 
illustrates carefully the causal chains connecting these phenomena: a 
drought, agricultural depletions, large-scale migration, political unrest, 
and ‘war in the heart of the Middle East’. Drought is also linked, in a 
different context, to the growth of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Obama is 
clear that climate change is not a direct cause of the war in Syria: ‘Un-
derstand, climate change did not cause the conflicts we see around the 
world’. He does suggest that climate change is related (through complex, 
indirect causal pathways – a ‘threat multiplier’ effect) to political 
violence and conflict, but is categorical that climate change is not a 
direct cause. It could be that he does not want to suggest that climate 
change is ‘causing’ the Syrian conflict because of its implications for the 
culpability of political actors for the conflict (e.g. ISIS and Asad’s gov-
ernment). He is thus being cautious about the extent to which he draws 
causal links between climate change, civil war, and outbreaks of 
violence. 
Writing for the sceptical think tank The Heritage Foundation (2015), 
Peter Brookes, a Senior Fellow in National Security Affairs, critiques the 
Obama administration’s associations of climate change and terrorism. 
Brookes (2015) writes that it is ‘substantively wrong to link climate 
change and terrorism – whether directly or indirectly. And relating the 
two to create a sense of national security urgency is not only misleading 
– it is dangerous because it distracts us from today’s very real, very 
immediate life-and-death threats from terrorism.’ He (2015) claims that 
it is wrong to link climate change and terrorism not only because this 
would be inaccurate, but also because this association detracts from the 
threats of terrorism. However, in making this argument in the context of 
a sceptical think tank (the Heritage Foundation (Dunlap & Jacques, 
2013)), it could also be that Brookes wants to dissociate climate change 
and terrorism in order to devalue climate change concerns in the US 
Government. From a different perspective, that of the right-wing news 
outlet Breitbart, Martel (2014) reports on the release of the 2014 Center 
for Naval Analyses Military Advisory Board’s report National Security 
and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change. The title of Martel’s (2014) 
piece is: ‘Climate change, not Islam, is catalyst for terrorism, Arab 
Spring, Syrian war’. She (2014) also notes that ‘the report goes on to 
blame climate change for a number of political phenomena that are 
notably linked by an obvious culprit: radical Islam’. From Martel’s 
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perspective, writing for Breitbart, it could be that drawing causal re-
lationships between terrorism and climate change is problematic not 
only because climate change is considered an inadequate causal factor, 
but also because it detracts away from other causes of political violence, 
i.e. ‘Islam’ and ‘radical Islam’. 
What these examples reveal is a nuanced, contested politics of 
attribution for climate change-terrorism-radicalisation in-
terconnections. Obama draws lines between factors in a complex causal 
chain, but is careful to situate the indirect causal implications of climate 
impacts. Similarly, for different political reasons, Brookes (about the 
central importance of terrorism as an issue), and Martel (the central role 
of ‘Islam’ and ‘radical Islam’ in terrorism), draw different kinds of causal 
relationships which do not identify the role of climate change. For a 
climate terrorist assemblage composed of many different components 
(documents, discourses of ‘climate security’, migration decisions, 
droughts, legislation) that interact in causally complex, non- 
deterministic ways, these interventions represent an attempt to delin-
eate or codify these complex causal relations, to ‘draw lines’ on which 
components produce intra-agential interactions in particular moments. 
Framed by political contestation and ideological differences, these de-
lineations represent ‘fixes’ or territorialisations of a climate terrorism 
assemblage, attempts to explain climate change-terrorism-radicalisation 
relations. As Latour (1988) states, explanations involve establishing 
relations between two lists, one list (A) involving an inventory of things 
to be explained (food and water insecurities, migrations, outbreaks of 
violence), and another list (B) providing the factors to be the explanation 
(climate change impacts, e.g. droughts). The power of the explanation 
rests in its ability to link items from list A to causal factors in list B: the 
ability of the explanation to establish links across contexts, to act or 
‘explain’ across distance. As such, explanations can be defined as ‘a 
measure of a distance between contexts’ (Latour, 1988, p. 160, original 
emphasis). To bridge these contexts requires epistemological work, 
networks of social actants that constitute explanations as a process of 
‘empire-building’ (Latour, 1988, p. 161). Obama, Martel and Brookes all 
attempt to draw explanatory lines between lists ‘A’ and ‘B’, to establish 
causal relations at a distance (whether between climate change and 
terrorism, to refute these linkages, or between ‘radical Islam’ and 
terrorism). 
A causal ‘line’ in this instance is formed through multiple compo-
nents of an assemblage interacting to produce the discursive effect of a 
causal relationship between these factors. As assemblage components, 
these speech acts assume an expressive role that – through linguistic 
signification – codifies a climate terrorism assemblage according to 
particular causal chains (linking climate change, terrorism and radi-
calisation). They assemble alongside the human assemblages of Obama, 
Martel and Brookes, and a network of think tanks and political organi-
sations involved in climate change debates (the White House, Depart-
ment of Defense, Center for Naval Analyses, Environmental Protection 
Agency, Heritage Foundation, etc.) to compose the causal lines that 
define the assemblage. These moments – ‘drawing lines’ – constitute 
what I term ‘strategic territorialisations’: interventions to fix the com-
plex causal interactions (to build explanatory power between compo-
nents ‘A’ and ‘B’) between an assemblage’s components. Strategic 
territorialisations derive from Spivak’s (2012(1987), p. 205, original 
emphasis) notion of ‘strategic essentialism’: ‘a strategic use of positive 
essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest’. A call for stra-
tegic essentialist strategies responds to a ‘constitutive paradox’ in 
poststructuralist, antihumanist thought: ‘‘that the essentialising 
moment, the object of their criticism, is irreducible’ (Spivak, 2012 
(1987), p. 205). Spivak recognises that essentialising moments, whilst 
always already contingent, are impossible to avoid. Strategic territori-
alisations represent moments at which the climate terrorist assemblage 
is fixed: attempts to freeze-frame complex causal relations between 
climate impacts (drought), food insecurity, migration, conflict, and 
terrorism into delineated causal chains. These territorialisations are 
strategic in the sense that unequal power relations (‘visible political 
interests’) cross scales. Causal linkages not only highlight micro-scale 
links between factors in a causal argument (the likelihood of food 
insecurity exacerbating migration, for example), but also feed into to 
broader discourses (to promote climate mitigation and adaptation, to 
emphasise the War on Terrorism, to delegitimise climate change pol-
icies, or to fight against ‘radical Islam’). Importantly, however, I contend 
that strategic essentialisations are not only attempts to ‘explain’ complex 
causal dynamics in a climate terrorism assemblage, but are also mo-
ments at which intersectional subject formations are crystallised. In 
moments where a climate terrorism assemblage is composed (from 
speech acts, institutions, human actors), ‘lines are drawn’ between cli-
matic variability, livelihood insecurities, migration, and possibilities of 
political violence), a climate terrorism assemblage territorialises around 
intersectional subject formations. These subject formations are con-
structed as both a response to, and as constitutive of, conditions of 
climate insecurity. Specifically, I argue that a climate terrorism assem-
blage constellates around young, ‘frustrated’ masculinities in climate 
security debates. 
5. Intersectionality and a climate terrorism assemblage 
DeLanda (2006) argues that subjectivity within an assemblage can be 
conceptualised as distributed assembly of subpersonal components – 
impressions, posture, thoughts, habits, skills, etc. – which have partic-
ular capacities (e.g. to make decisions or produce speech acts). Sub-
jectivities within a climate terrorism assemblage assemble a variety of 
different components: in this section I argue that speech acts, concepts of 
intersectional subject formation, particular theoretical tools (in partic-
ular ‘youth bulge theory’), public actors, and national security reports 
are assembled together to form particular moments of strategic terri-
torialisation. Building on Delanda’s (2006) foundation, I utilise Puar’s 
(2007) critique of intersectional theory from the perspective of assem-
blage theory. Krenshaw (1991, p. 1296), defines intersectionality as ‘a 
way of mediating the tension between assertions of multiple identities 
and the on-going necessity of group politics.’ She (1991: 1245) differ-
entiates between different forms of intersectionality. First is structural 
intersectionality, the multiple structural factors that make the experi-
ences of women of colour fundamentally different to those of White 
women. Second is political intersectionality, the ways in which feminist 
and antiracist movements both fight against patriarchy, sexism and 
racism, but do not always account for the particular inequalities expe-
rienced by women of colour. Third is representational intersectionality, 
concerned with the discursive and cultural construction of women of 
colour (Krenshaw, 1991). Writing about the double, mutually reinforc-
ing oppressions experienced by women of colour in the US, Krenshaw 
(1991) argues that identity categories, whilst socially constructed, have 
material, exclusionary effects. Puar (2007) critiques intersectionality 
models which suggest that identities must be named, fixed or stabilised. 
Contrastingly, assemblage thinking is ‘more attuned to interwoven 
forces that merge and dissipate time, space, and body against linearity, 
coherency, and permanency’ (Puar, 2007, p. 213). Puar (2007) draws on 
Massumi’s (2002) critique of identities as embedded in ontologies of 
‘position’. Massumi (2002) argues that ‘positions’ are secondary to an 
ontological field of emergence: a field of affective potentiality that is 
perpetual, immanent, and with no boundaries of interiority or exteri-
ority. Massumi (2002, p. 7) contends that signification is located in a 
zone ‘of arrest’, a derivative ‘second-order movement between 
back-formed possibilities’. In terms of cultural and social determinations 
of position (e.g. gender or race), Massumi (2002, p. 8) notes that these 
are secondary in the sense that they back-form their reality. This does 
not establish an ontological separation from potentiality: Massumi 
(2002, p. 8) maintains that cultural determinations feed back into their 
processes of emergence. They are inseparable, but there is nonetheless 
an ontological difference between the field of emergence and position-
ings that emerge from this. 
Puar (2007) agrees with Massumi’s theorisation, and argues that 
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intersectional subjectivities are byproducts of ‘positionings’ in an 
assemblage, attempts to quell an assemblage’s perpetual mobility. 
Subjectivities can be considered as a form of strategic territorialisation 
within a climate terrorism assemblage. They represent points at which 
different components are composed – affects of ‘frustration’ and ‘anger’, 
National Intelligence Council reports, particular words (‘young’, 
‘dissatisfied’, ‘male’), and identity constructions (conceptions of 
masculinity) – and territorialise at points of causal connection between 
climate change, terrorism and radicalisation. As such, a climate 
terrorism assemblage is partially (re)comprised of intersectional (re) 
territorialisations that are back-formed against these immanent 
conditions of emergence. In this context, the idea of a sovereign, 
determining or operating ‘subject’ is instead a ‘subject-effect’ (Spivak, 
2012 (1987), p. 204): an effect of heterogeneous, discontinuous 
networks comprised of many strands, e.g. history, ideology, economy, 
etc. Different configurations of these strands (components in a climate 
terrorism assemblage) produce the effect of a sovereign subject, and 
each strand is simultaneously woven into many others (Spivak, 2012 
(1987)). In a climate terrorism assemblage, intersectional subject for-
mations represent one form of strategic territorialisation: 
context-specific ‘subject-effects’ in climate security politics. At the 
points at which the causal ‘lines are drawn’ in a climate terrorist 
assemblage, attempts to isolate causal connections between a range of 
factors that link climate change, radicalisation and terrorism (for 
example migration, or outbreaks of protests against authoritarian gov-
ernments), I argue that an intersectional subjectivity is constructed of a 
young, frustrated masculinity that is vulnerable to recruitment by 
terrorist groups. Thus, a climate terrorism assemblage territorialises 
strategically around a particular subject formation in these moments of 
causal connection. I touch on three speech acts and a theoretical tool 
(‘youth bulge theory’) as components which are important for the 
codification of this subject formation in a climate terrorism assemblage. 
Firstly, in an interview held with Thomas Friedman for the New York 
Times (June 9th, 2014), Barack Obama (cited by Barron-Lopez, 2014) 
discusses the environments within which terrorist activities can take 
place: 
‘When people are hungry, when there are a lot of young people, 
particularly young men, who are drifting without prospects of the 
future, the fertility of the soil for terrorism ends up being significant’ 
Speaking to HuffPost Live (December 3rd, 2015) during the same 
period as the Paris Climate Conference, the American science writer Bill 
Nye (cited by Melinno, 2015) discusses the links between climate 
change, the Syrian Civil War, and the development of NSAG groups: 
‘There is a water shortage in Syria, this is fact-based – small and 
medium farmers have abandoned their farms because there’s not 
enough water … And especially the young people who have not 
grown up there … the young people have gone to the big cities 
looking for work … there’s not enough work for everybody, so the 
disaffected youths … the young people who don’t believe in the 
system, believe the system has failed, don’t believe in the economy – 
are more easily engaged and more easily recruited by terrorist or-
ganisations, and then they end up part way around the world in Paris 
shooting people’ 
In these excerpts, Obama and Nye speculate on the identity charac-
teristics of individuals who are vulnerable to terrorism and radical-
isation in conditions of climate insecurity. Obama claims that in 
situations where ‘people are hungry’ as a result of food and water in-
securities generated by climate impacts, especially where there is a large 
population of young people, this creates conditions that can lead to 
terrorism. In particular, it is ‘young men’ who are identified as creating a 
‘significant’, ‘fertile’ soil for the development of terrorist activities. 
Interviewed over a year later on the specific example of the Syrian Civil 
War, Bill Nye identifies a similar causal chain to Obama grounded in 
agricultural insecurity, rural-urban migration, disaffection, and terrorist 
activity. Nye repeatedly isolates the individuals involved in these social 
processes as ‘young’: the ‘young people’ who have grown up, become 
disaffected and moved to cities for work, and the ‘disaffected youth’ who 
‘don’t believe in the system’, are ‘more easily engaged and more easily 
recruited by terrorist organisations’, and end up ‘in Paris shooting 
people’. Nye, whilst he does not identify a link with young males, draws 
a more direct connection between the actions and disaffections of young 
people and terrorist violence (linking these to the Paris terror attacks in 
2015). Given that he is speaking contemporaneously with the (2015) 
Paris Climate Summit, as with similar comments from Bernie Sanders, it 
could be that Nye is trying to draw attention to these issues and to 
climate change more broadly. 
However, in both of their commentaries, Barack Obama and Bill Nye, 
whilst drawing upon different contexts (Obama discussing the general 
causal mechanisms and Nye the Syrian Civil War and its links to 
terrorism and climate change), construct a young and (in Obama’s case) 
male subjectivity that is particularly prone to or vulnerable to terrorism. 
In these instances a climate terrorism assemblage territorialises at 
particular points of causal connection – the point of rural-urban 
migration and subsequent economic and political frustration – and 
these territorialisations crystallise as intersectional subject formations. 
As a second example, I draw on a report from the National Intelligence 
Council (NIC), an interagency group that supports the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence ((DNI), the US President’s highest advisor on national 
security issues). The NIC are a central component of the institutional 
actors which compose a climate terrorism assemblage: climate security 
discourses in the US are targeted primarily towards the defense sector 
and security-oriented think tanks (e.g. the Department of Defense, 
Center for a New American Security, and Center for Naval Analyses) and 
it is not uncommon for political officials to move between government 
and think tank positions (Diez et al., 2016). The NIC publish long-term 
analyses for the US intelligence community (e.g. the Department of 
State, CIA and National Security Agency) (DNI, 2015). For the Estimate, 
the NIC also produced a series of regional reports and consultations 
about the geopolitical implications of climate change (to 2030); as 
products of consultations, these documents do not represent the views of 
the US government (NIC 2009). Discussing climate insecurities in North 
African cities, the NIC note (2009, p. 15): 
‘Cities like Cairo, Casablanca, Alexandria, Algiers, and Oran are 
already overflowing with thousands of angry and unemployed young 
men who congregate in ghetto-like environments passing their days 
leaning on walls with little to no hope of escaping their fate.’ 
Later in the document (p.19), these claims are elaborated: 
‘Islamic extremists across the region may exploit climate change’s 
destabilizing impacts and ineffective state responses to promote the 
spread of militancy and anti-regime violence. Indeed, Islamist mil-
itants could point to climate-induced catastrophes as evidence as 
God’s wrath against “apostate regimes” whose un-Islamic behaviour 
has plunged the region into desperate circumstances … Moreover, 
Islamic extremist groups could take advantage of dire socioeconomic 
conditions to recruit more followers, particularly among disaffected 
youth in the shanty towns of Morocco and Algeria. The concentration 
of unattached, unemployed young men in overstressed North Africa 
cities as well as disaffected, marginalized rural communities under 
acute climatic stress will provide ideal recruiting grounds for 
extremists.’ 
In these excerpts, a climate terrorism assemblage crystallises around 
affective resonances of hopelessness, anger, susceptibility to Islamist 
extremist ideologies and disaffection. Adjectives such as ‘overstressed’ 
and ‘overflowing’ manufacture an image of overstretched urban envi-
ronments and communities at ‘bursting’ or ‘boiling point’, a simmering 
anger and dissatisfaction. These excerpts also reinforce a subjectivity of 
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fatalism and hopelessness among young men in North African cities, e.g. 
with the phrase ‘little hope of escaping their fate’. An representation of 
fatalism is also engendered earlier in the report when the NIC (2009, pp. 
18–19) claim: ‘North Africans tend to hold a religiously-based view that 
“what will be, will be.” Owing to this fatalistic mindset, North Africans 
are unlikely to blame the state for climate related stresses.’ In one sense, 
this suggests a generalised fatalism that separates ‘North Africans’ from 
their agency to react in different ways to climate-insecure situations. 
This could be reinforced through the imagery of idleness implied by 
young men ‘passing their days leaning on walls’. If young men are 
dissatisfied and unemployed, they may be vulnerable to Islamist ideas 
which ‘point to climate-induced catastrophe as evidence of God’s wrath 
against “apostate regimes.”’ Finally, young men are said to be ‘angry’, 
which creates an image of frustrated, anti-Western young men who are 
susceptible to ‘Islamist ideas’ in conditions of climate insecurity. 
Moreover, North African males are at their most ‘risky’ in congregation, 
with a ‘concentration of unattached, unemployed young men’ and 
‘thousands of angry and unemployed young men who congregate in 
ghetto-like environments’. In this speech act, a variety of components – 
affective resonances of frustration and anger, ideological concepts 
(‘anti-Westernism’ and ‘Islamism’) – are assembled to form a young 
masculine subjectivity in a climate terrorism assemblage. 
Alongside speech acts, theoretical tools also form an important un-
derpinning for a climate terrorism assemblage, for example ‘youth bulge 
theory’. Developed in 1985 by geographer Garry Fuller whilst a visiting 
scholar to the CIA’s Office of Global Issues, ‘youth bulge’ theory was 
designed to provide intelligence analysts with a tool to predict national 
security threats (Hendrixson, 2014). A ‘youth bulge’ is a scenario 
whereby people aged 15–24 represent above 20% of a national popu-
lation (Hendrixson, 2014). It is argued to correlate – when combined 
with poor educational opportunities, unemployment and unequal 
resource allocations – with an increased propensity towards violence 
(Dowd, 2015). Noting the racialized and gendered assumptions of ‘youth 
bulge’ theory, Hendrixson (2014, p. 8) argues: ‘personified as a 
discontented, angry young man, almost always a man of colour, the 
“youth bulge” is seen as an unpredictable, out-of-control force in the 
South generally, with Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia and Latin 
America all considered hotspots.’ Overall, she (2014) contends that such 
assertions of grand numbers of young men in congregation are reduc-
tionist, strip young men of their agency and subjectivity (particularly in 
reaction to conditions of climate insecurity), and do not account for the 
diversity of young male – and female – experiences. Youth bulge theory 
functions as an important component which – in interaction with other 
components, e.g. affects of frustration and speech acts – folds into the 
moments at which a climate terrorism assemblage strategically terri-
torialises around a young, masculine subjectivity. 
During the War on Terror, homonormative and heteronormative 
patriotism has been apparent in sections of the US media and politics 
(Kunstman, Haritaworn, & Petzen, 2010). Supposedly protecting US 
citizens from Islam’s inherent homophobia, ‘Muslim’ masculinities have 
been pathologised (for instance a diagnosis of terrorists’ martyrdom 
(based on the promise of sexual pleasure in paradise) as failed hetero-
sexuality) and queered mockingly in opposition to a masculinist, 
nationalist US imaginary (Puar & Rai, 2002). Collectively, these dis-
courses manufacture a figure of a homosocial, violent, ‘Muslim’ male 
figure (Puar & Rai, 2002). Puar (2007, p. 222) argues that terrorist as-
semblages invoke a need to theorise such queered bodies, including 
‘suicide bombers’, ‘queer drag queens’, ‘the monster-terrorist-fag’, and 
the ‘tortured Muslim body’, among others. In the specific context of a 
climate terrorism assemblage, the figure of the ‘climate terrorist’ (Cha-
turvedi and Doyle (2015, p. 135)) – crystallised as a young, male, 
frustrated migrant – represents an Othered, threatening subjectivity. 
The figure of the ‘climate terrorist’ is a particular strategic territoriali-
sation, one that territorialises a range of different components – 
anti-Western discourses, racialized, affective intensities of ‘frustration’ 
and economic ‘hopelessness’, and climate-induced food insecurities – in 
a climate terrorism assemblage. It is also strategically territorialised with 
broader terrorist assemblages, feeding into broader exclusionary dis-
courses that construct young, ‘African’ males and circumscribe their 
possibilities (emphasising a vulnerability to terrorist violence) in 
climate-insecure futures. These strategic territorialisations – ‘sub-
ject-effects’ of young masculinities – are racialized, gendered compo-
nents of a climate terrorist assemblage. However, they are also situated 
more specifically in the unequal power relations that constitute con-
nections drawn between climate change, terrorism and radicalisation. 
When these causal links are drawn, for example between the risks of 
food and water scarcities, rural-urban migration, decreased livelihoods 
and political dissatisfaction, one manifestation of the ‘risks’ or ‘threats’ 
in climate-insecure futures is constructed as a young African male who is 
fatalistic, frustrated, and vulnerable to radicalisation and extremist 
violence. Thus, as part of attempts to ‘draw lines’ or to ‘fix’ a climate 
terrorism assemblage according to particular interpretations of causal 
relations, one form in which strategic territorialisations take is sub-
jectification in scenarios of future climate insecurity. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that climate change-terrorism- 
radicalisation connections can be productively conceptualised as a 
‘climate terrorism assemblage’. Assemblage thinking, through the 
concept of strategic territorialisation, locates debates about complex 
causality in a nuanced, contested politics of attribution. Particular 
combinations of components in a climate terrorism assemblage ‘draw’ – 
territorialise – causal links that reflect underlying political interests. 
Additionally, a climate terrorist assemblage reveals how intersectional 
identities – constellations that produce ‘subject-effects’ – are constituted 
in conditions of climate insecurity: a young, male, economically frus-
trated and radicalised climate migrant. As such, strategic territorialisa-
tions can underwrite processes of Othering in climate change-terrorism- 
radicalisation dynamics, particularly at points where causal connections 
are drawn in these contexts. 
Importantly, there are key limitations to this approach. Methodo-
logically, the examples in this paper draw upon textual, discursive ma-
terials from climate security debates (e.g. political speeches and policy 
reports). As such, this analysis relies to a large extent upon representa-
tional analysis and critique of the political contexts that inform climate 
security discourses. However, this raises key limitations for analysing a 
climate terrorism assemblage, a formation composed of material, af-
fective resonances alongside enunciative and codified materials. As 
such, this account risks what Tolia-Kelly (2011) terms ‘surface geogra-
phies’: descriptions and collages of the materialities of places, things and 
representations, but without a connection to the political and theoretical 
contexts of material realities. In light of this critique, further study is 
needed of how a climate terrorism assemblage (de)territorialises and its 
concomitant trajectories: which material and enunciative, human and 
nonhuman elements interact in these processes? 
Finally, what does this theorisation – a climate terrorism assemblage 
– offer to critical climate security scholarship? First, the paper offers an 
empirical account of the politics of climate change, terrorism and radi-
calisation connections (focusing on claims about causal attribution and 
subjectivities composed at these causal intersections), adding to the 
broader literature on climate security politics (e.g. McDonald, 2013). 
Secondly, this paper’s contribution is to theorise these relationships in 
the context of casual complexity: to understand the role that particular 
power relations play in composing causal claims in a climate terrorism 
assemblage. Assemblage thinking provides a clear way to trace in-
terventions in this complexity in climate security issues, to use analysis 
and evaluation to ‘move the complex in this way or that’, as Connolly 
(2004, pp. 334–5) suggests. However, as Braun (2008) notes, what does 
assemblage theory, new materialist and neo-vitalist scholarship offer 
beyond assertions that social processes are ‘relational’ and thick 
empirical descriptions of these relations? How can it influence policy 
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debates? One tentative conclusion is that a climate terrorism assemblage 
is perpetually open to change; it is fundamentally dynamic and open to 
potential futurities. This desensitises attempts to naturalise or strategi-
cally territorialise unequal power relations – rendering climate security 
(and climate change-terrorism-radicalisation relations) always open to 
critique, interrogation of its historical and geographical contexts, and 
analysis of its contingent, fragile compositions. 
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